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Practitioner’s Abstract: Academia and the finance industry generate many proposals
for new contract markets.   Unfortunately, many proposed markets lack the critical
attributes that promote success.  We examine these attributes, and evaluate the potential
of several announced proposals.  We find that proposals emanating from the academy
generally fail to consider the full suite of integrated financial services necessary to
support a viable market, while proposals put forward by practitioners are much more
likely to do so.
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I. Introduction
At any given moment, there are numerous proposals for new contract markets.  Indeed,
the financial world has an impressive history of innovation in contract markets, with
many notable successes.   The most conspicuous evidence on such performance is
available from organized futures exchanges.  The number of active futures markets has
increased dramatically in the last quarter century.  As a rough guide, Table 1 presents the
number of futures markets with price quotations in the first issues of the Wall Street
Journal in 1979 and 2004, by category (commodity, equity index, etc.).  The total number
has increased over this time frame from 40 to 83.   The most actively traded futures
markets today include interest rate, energy, and stock index markets, most of which were
established in  the past  quarter  century.    Looking  beyond  futures  markets,  recent
innovation has been intense in exchange-traded options and over-the-counter (OTC)
derivative trading. 
The history of contract market innovation is replete with failures, however.     Silber
(1981) finds that less than one third of new futures contracts introduced between 1960
and 1977 achieved an annual trading volume greater than 10,000 contracts three years
after introduction.  Pennings and Leuthold (1999) report that by Silber’s criteria, fifty-
eight percent of exchange-traded commodity contracts introduced between 1994 and 1998
failed.  Some recently listed futures contracts that have attracted relatively little trading
interest include: numerous cross exchange rate futures at the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME), temperature degree-day futures at the CME, and narrow stock market
index (e.g. Dow Jones Transportation Index) futures at both the CME and the Chicago
Board of Trade (CBOT).
Suggestions for new contract markets are generally put forward by academic economists
with an interest in a particular area, industry participants seeking hedging opportunities,
or by derivative exchanges or dealers interested in increasing order flow and revenue.
These proponents typically cite a possible hedging demand and a lack of similar
instruments   as   reasons   why   a   particular   proposal   is   likely   to   achieve   success.
Unfortunately, only casual attention is given to the literature on contract market viability.
This literature has identified numerous factors other than hedging demand and contract
novelty that impact a contract design’s eventual success.The purpose of this paper is to assess the potential viability of recently proposed contract
markets using concrete criteria, reflecting the lessons learned regarding market viability
over the last century.   Before presenting our assessments, we define the criteria for
determining contract success, and identify the critical conditions required to achieve
liquidity. 
 
Proposal put forth in the last several years include residential real estate price index
derivative, economic derivatives, livelihood insurance, commodity-linked developing
world   debt,   FOMC   options,   single-stock   binary   options,   information   aggregation
mechanisms (IAM) markets,  event ticket markets, various weather contracts, and credit
derivatives.  We assess the first four of these proposals.
II. Criteria for Contract Market Success
Our focus is on derivative contracts, not spot transactions.  Hull (2000) declares that “a
derivative (or derivative security) is a financial instrument whose value depends on the
values of other, more basic underlying variables.”  The variety of derivatives includes
standard futures, forwards, spreads, the dizzying array of options, swaps, and strips,
among others.
1  
Many authors take the pragmatic approach of defining market success as the achievement
of sustained, significant levels of trading activity.  This activity is typically measured by
the trading volume and open interest statistics reported by regulated futures exchanges.
As mentioned above, Silber (1981) regards a successful futures contract as one with an
annual trading volume of 10,000 contracts three years after listing.  Sandor (1973) uses
the more relaxed criterion of 1,000 contracts traded annually.  Cartlton (1984) and Black
(1986) simplify the definition (and observation) of success for futures contracts further
still – implementing the “Wall Street Journal test” whereby listing in that Journal is the
criterion.  This requires a daily trading volume of 1,000 contracts and an open interest of
5,000 contracts, a much more stringent criterion than either Silber’s or Sandor’s.  Note
that all of these criteria define success essentially from the point of view of the organized
futures exchange, as trading activity is a proxy for exchange revenue, which is in turn a
component of exchange members’ utility.  In the case of OTC markets operated by a
single entity (e.g., the Intercontinental Exchange), a trading activity criterion for market
success is instead a proxy for the organizing entity’s revenue and utility.  In the case of a
decentralized principal-to-principal OTC market (e.g., the interbank foreign exchange
market), a trading activity criterion for market success is not particularly relevant.
An alternative is to judge the success of a contract market from society’s point of view
rather than the exchange’s.   Working (1953, 1970) notes three primary economic
1 Williams (2001), however, takes issue with describing many futures contracts as derivatives of their
corresponding spot prices.  He notes the common practice of spot trading in physical commodities at price
differentials to a futures contract, making the case for regarding futures prices as primitive rather derivative.
He states that “physicals markets … do not exist independently of the derivative markets.  This fact exposes
that ‘derivatives’ is not the most informative term.”  We do not engage either side of this debate, but instead
sidestep the issue by simply referring to markets for any of the instruments mentioned above as “contract
markets.”functions of commodity futures markets, each of which promotes an increase in society’s
welfare.  First, futures markets are useful to handlers of a commodity, providing means of
hedging inventories and forward marketing.  Second, futures markets provide publicly
observable   prices   for   a   commodity  that   are   established   in   an   open,   competitive
environment.  In the absence of a futures market and such publicly observable prices,
smaller firms in an industry can be at an informational disadvantage with regards to
current market conditions. The third function is the facilitation of intertemporal allocation
of a commodity.  A futures market allows a merchant to purchase a commodity in the
spot market, and simultaneously arrange for its sale in the future at a known price (in the
case of a storable commodity).  This tends to attenuate the price depressing effects of a
current excess supply, spreading the consumption of the commodity out over a period of
time.  Likewise, in the event of a current excess demand for a commodity, the ability to
purchase for future delivery at a lower price encourages a shift in intertemporal
consumption to more closely match the expected arrival of additional supplies.  Producers
also receive price signals from futures prices (Just and Rausser, 1983).  A high (low)
price for delivery of a commodity at a date in the future encourages increased (decreased)
production.
Telser reinforces and extends Working’s analysis.   In a series of papers (Telser   &
Higinbotham 1977, Telser 1981, Telser 1986), he argues that the primary functions of
futures markets are the reduction of transactions costs and the facilitation of trade among
strangers.  This latter function is accomplished via the institution of the clearinghouse.  In
short, the clearinghouse is a surrogate counterparty in all trades.   Two traders, upon
discovering  complimentary  position   requirements,   each  take   the  offsetting  desired
positions with the clearinghouse.  This arrangement relieves the two traders of the need to
asses   one   another’s   creditworthiness,   with   each   instead   trusting   only   in   the
creditworthiness of the clearinghouse.  Thus the existence of a futures market allows
transacting at reduced cost relative to spot or forward trade in a commodity, with futures
in effect serving a role analogous to money.  Continuing the analogy, Telser notes that
futures markets facilitate long and short hedging, in the same way that the existence of
currency facilitates the borrowing and lending of credit.   This in turn facilitates
intertemporal allocation of the commodity, thus smoothing its consumption, a potentially
significant benefit to society.  Telser further asserts that this benefit is due to the very
existence of the futures market, regardless of the level of open commitments (Telser
1986, p. S20).   Essentially, the Working-Telser criterion that any futures market that
attracts sufficient trading activity to sustain its own existence can be deemed a success.
The existence of such success tends to provide benefits to society.  To be sure, these
benefits include facilitation of hedging, reduction of transaction costs, price discovery,
and intertemporal allocation of supplies of a physical commodity.  The combination of
these last two benefits provide the foundation for a reliable forward price curve.
To some extent, Working-Telser concepts are codified into U.S. law.  Title 7, Chapter 1,
Section 5 of the US Code gives the findings and purpose of the Commodity Exchange
Act (as modified by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000).  The Act states
that: 
The transactions subject to this Act are entered into regularly in interstate
and international commerce and are affected with a national public interestby providing a means for managing and assuming price risks, discovering
prices, or disseminating pricing information through trading in liquid, fair
and financially secure trading facilities.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) interprets the meaning of the
Commodity Exchange Act with respect to the economic and public interest requirements
for contract market designation in Title 17, Chapter 1, Appendix A to Part 5 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (a.k.a. “Guideline No. 1”).  They specify three primary rules: 1)
contracts must not be designed so as to be conducive to price manipulation or distortion,
2) any cash settled contracts should be based on a “cash price series that is reliable,
acceptable, publicly available and timely”, and 3) contracts must be expected to be used
for hedging and/or price basing on a more than an occasional basis.
2   U.S. law and
regulation thus designate the hedging and price discovery functions of contract markets as
important, but make no specific mention of the intertemporal allocation and transaction
cost reduction roles that Working and Telser describe for futures markets.  
The existing literature on contract market viability focuses almost exclusively on futures
markets.  We, however, consider diverse varieties of proposed contract markets – futures,
forward, and options (both exchange-traded and over-the-counter).  Accordingly, we also
assess the benefits provided by non-futures contract markets, and how the criteria for
evaluating the success of such markets might differ.  
Certainly the hedging function is central to any proposed contract market, regardless of
variety.  Price discovery can be considered an important benefit of any market whose
prices are publicly disseminated.  In the context of an option market, the price discovery
function can be re-interpreted as a probability discovery function, where observed prices
reveal the market consensus probabilities of possible future states of the world (Breeden
& Litzenberger, 1978).  Price discovery thus remains an important role for any of the
contract markets that will be considered.  However, option markets play no direct role in
the intertemporal allocation of supplies of a physical commodity.
3  Also, over-the-counter
contract markets generally do not provide the benefit of allowing trade among strangers at
reduced cost, as there is typically no clearinghouse in such markets.  
 The criterion we use in the following analysis of suggested contract markets is similar to
that Telser suggested for futures markets: if a market is likely to attract sufficient trading
activity to constitute a viable ongoing concern, then it provides the foundation for
generating benefits to society.
Recent advances in technology are expected to continue to evolve and may well influence
contract   viability.    Several   organized   derivative   exchanges   outside   the   U.S.   now
exclusively trade electronically: the London International Financial Futures Exchange and
2 Guideline No. 1 is based on the Commodity Exchange Act before it was modified by the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000.  There has been no re-interpretation.
3 However, the arbitrage relationships that exist between futures and associated futures options markets
imply that the latter can have an indirect role in intertemporal supply allocation.  Specifically, the put-call
parity relationship is such that particular combinations of futures options positions constitute a “synthetic
futures” position.  See Hull (2000) for details.Eurex being two noteworthy examples.  U.S. exchanges are increasing their activity in
this realm as well; witness the available overnight electronic trading in many markets,
simultaneous electronic and open-outcry trading in interest-rate contracts at the Chicago
Board of Trade, and exclusive electronic trading of some contracts (e.g. the “e-mini” S&P
500 index futures contract at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange).  Motivating this trend is
the calculation that the infrastructure required to support an automated trade-matching
system is significantly less expensive to maintain than that required to support a
traditional double-auction (i.e. open outcry) system.  If an exchange already has electronic
trading and clearing facilities in place, the marginal cost of listing additional contracts for
electronic trade is likely to be fairly low.  This implies that contracts that would have
been considered failures (from an exchange’s point of view) in the past may be available
for trade in the future.  In the over-the-counter realm, technological advances are likely to
reduce dealers’ cost of negotiating contracts, and thus similarly effect the range of viable
contracts that would otherwise exist.
III. Key Characteristics of Successful Contracts
In this section, we consider the five basic conditions necessary for the existence of a
viable contract market.   These conditions are 1) the existence of a precisely defined
underlying value, 2) the provision of mechanisms that ensure contract enforceability and
acceptable counterparty risk, 3) the provision of market making services, 4) the existence
of markets for laying off risk, 5) the existence of an impetus for trade, and 6) the
attraction of hedging activity.  The first three conditions constitute a suite of integrated
financial services that the organizing entity must provide before trading can begin in
earnest, while the last three conditions are necessary for a market to thrive once trading
has commenced.
The first basic condition necessary for a viable contract market is the existence of a
precisely defined underlying value.  There must exist an active trade in an asset that will
be deliverable against the prospective contract, or whose price will serve as the basis for
cash settlement of the contract.  Alternatively, a contract that specifies cash settlement
may be based on an available price index or the realization of an observable random
variable.   If no such trade, price index, or random variable exists, trading cannot
commence.   This may seem obvious, but as we will see the establishment of some
proposed markets are contingent upon the creation and acceptance of a suitable price
index.  As a result, this condition may well separate the more concrete proposals that
might be easily implemented from those proposals whose implementation is remote.  An
asset or price index that will underlie the proposed contract must be widely accepted by
the industry as a standard, reliable value benchmark.
The second basic condition necessary for a viable organized contract market is an
acceptable counterparty risk profile.  Before making a trade participants must have a
reasonable expectation that their counterparty will perform under the terms of the
contract.  Provisions for managing counterparty risk are observed in existing successful
contract markets.  Williams (2001) notes that several institutional features of futures and
futures option markets relieve participants from concern that their counterparties will
default.  First, the official clearinghouse is introduced as a surrogate counterparty in everytransaction – every buyer's seller and every seller's buyer.  This novation allows market
participants   to   focus   only   on   the   creditworthiness   of   the   clearinghouse.     The
clearinghouse in turn ensures its own solvency by requiring its counterparties (those with
positions in the market) to deposit and maintain funds in a margin account that guarantees
contract performance.  Furthermore, the margin account is generally debited (credited) for
each day's decrease (increase) in the market value of the trader's portfolio.  This helps to
prevent the growth of large unprofitable positions on which a trader might default.
Substantial incidences of default in over-the-counter contract markets may even motivate
the development of markets with such protection mechanisms.  Indeed, Telser (1977,
1981) sees the trade among strangers that is facilitated by these protection mechanisms as
the primary motivation for the existence of futures markets.  By contrast, forward contract
markets do not incorporate such protection mechanisms, and thus do not facilitate trade
among strangers at low transaction cost.
The third basic condition necessary for the existence of a viable contract market is the
provision of market making services.  In all contract markets, there can be no reasonable
expectation that the order flow generated by hedgers will be precisely balanced, i.e. that
an order to buy will always arrive in the market at the same time that an order to sell.
Furthermore, traders must be assured that once they take a position, it will be possible to
exit that position at a “fair” price.  These issues give rise to the need for short-term
liquidity provision in the market.  There are two mechanisms by which market making
might happen.  First, a market might have an official market maker who is required to
simultaneously quotes both sides of the market at all times.  This is the case, for example,
in markets such as those that were operated by the now defunct Enron Online.  Attracting
such traders is only possible in markets that have a significant, consistent order flow,
however, as these traders typically make a very small average profit on a very large
number of transactions.  In the absence of an official market maker, such services must be
provided by independent, short-term speculators.  
The fourth basic necessary condition, viz. the availability of markets for laying off risk, is
closely related to the provision of market making services.  If there is to be no officially
designated market maker, then a new market must attract voluntary market makers.  The
availability of correlated markets provides a means by which market makers can lay off
risk (short of unwinding their positions), which is particularly important in the case of a
new, illiquid contract.   Additionally, organized large-scale speculation is very often
motivated by expectations over changes in one price relative to another rather than simply
outright price changes.  For example, a trader might believe that market conditions are
such that in coming months electricity is going to become more valuable relative to the
natural gas that is used to produce that electricity, without having any particular
expectations regarding the absolute changes of either price.  This trader might then take
an appropriate “spark spread” position – long in an electricity forward market and short in
a natural gas forward market.  The existence of economically related markets is required
before such inter-market spreading can occur.
The fifth basic necessary condition for is the existence of an impetus for trade.  There
must exist a significant degree of price uncertainty, as it motivates the activity of both
hedgers and speculators, and its absence would obviate the market’s necessity (Telser1981,  Carlton   1984).     Horrigan (1987)  cites   the   significant   decrease  in   inflation
uncertainty in the 1980s as a primary reason for the poor performance of the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) futures contract that was briefly traded at the Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa
Exchange (now a part of the New York Board of Trade).  Note that we are careful to
distinguish between variability and uncertainty.  A price or other quantity underlying a
contract may be highly variable, but if this variation is perfectly predictable a contract is
unlikely to thrive.  In addition to outright price uncertainty, variability in the relative
levels of intertemporal prices contributes to an impetus for trade.
The sixth basic necessary condition is the attraction of hedging activity – a condition
seems to be more thoroughly considered than others in most market proposals.  Unlike
the first five conditions, which were relatively straightforward, there are several factors
that promote substantial hedging activity in a market: a large pool of potential hedgers,
heterogeneous hedger goals, a favorable environment with regard to existing contracts, a
good contract design, and freedom from market manipulation.  
A large, diverse underlying trade or risk pool is an important factor promoting hedging
activity.   There are two components to this condition.  First, a large value of transactions
in an underlying market implies that there is a greater potential overall benefit, in the
form of risk reduction, which will be made possible by the existence of a contract market
(Carlton 1984).  Second, an industry with low concentration and a minimal degree of
vertical integration implies the existence of a large number of potential hedgers and
encourages   the   development   of   contract   markets   (Carlton   1984,   Black   1986).
Additionally, a large, diverse underlying trade tends to reduce the potential for market
manipulation.   Alternatively, a proposed contract might be based simply on a non-
tradable random variable.   In such a case the analog to a large underlying trade is
widespread  economic   risk  associated  with  that   variable.    Weather   conditions   are
examples of such variables.
Heterogeneous goals are important.  A market cannot appeal exclusively to long or short
hedgers.  Speculators or market makers can absorb unbalanced hedger desires to some
extent, but a bias is likely to result if one type of hedger is underrepresented (Gray 1960),
and such markets typically have very low trading volume.  This need for heterogeneous
goals is closely akin to the Figlewski (1978, 1982) perspective that speculators have
heterogeneous expectations regarding future prices.  He notes that if all traders have the
same expectation regarding the future price of a contract, the market price will quickly
converge to this common expected value removing all motivation for trade.
Relation to existing contracts is also a critical determinant for new contract viability.  The
conventional  wisdom   is   that   new   contracts   that  allow  for   hedging  of  previously
unhedgable risks will be popular, as the theoretical models of Duffie & Jackson (1989)
and Cuny (1993) suggest.  Carlton (1983) provides empirical evidence that the Chicago
Board of Trade's rye futures contract failed because it was largely redundant, given the
other available grain futures markets.  As a practical matter, exchanges may very well
offer new contracts closely related to existing contracts (e.g. those of the soybean and
crude oil complexes).  Williams (2001) points out that such complexes of related markets
represent specific economic activities: bean crushing, oil cracking, grain milling, bargetransportation, etc.  Offering a menu of correlated contracts provides the ability to hedge
such transformation activities, and thus a new market being highly correlated with an
existing market will not necessarily result in low hedging use.  The recent development of
several successful “e-mini” contracts provides additional counter evidence refuting the
argument that low correlation with existing markets is a necessary condition for market
success.     E-mini   markets   are  essentially  perfectly  correlated   with   there  full  size
counterpart contracts, but provide relief from the contract “lumpiness” problem.  In short,
some markets are complementary to one another – all highly correlated markets are not
competing substitutes as the conventional wisdom suggests.  In any case, however, a new
market must offer some unique characteristics that are useful to traders if it is to thrive.
Contract design  is important for all contracts.   For physically settled contracts, it is
important that the delivery provisions correspond to dominant industry practice (Gray
1965 ; Williams 2001).  This includes factors such as lot size, delivery locations, delivery
timing, grade of the asset, and the price differentials associated with deviations from the
standardized terms.   Poor design can result in a contract that favors either buyers or
sellers, at the expense of significant participation on the part the opposite side.  In the
case of cash-settled contracts, the choice of the underlying value is important.  It must be
chosen in such a way that hedgers do not face an excessive amount of basis risk.  Several
examples of markets that failed due to poor contract design are documented in the
literature.  Johnston & McConnell (1989) attribute the failure of the Chicago Board of
Trade's Government National Mortgage Association collateralized depository receipt
futures market to the availability of a competing contract with a design that more closely
matched hedgers' needs.  Thompson, Garcia & Wildman (1996) attribute the failure of the
Minneapolis Grain Exchange's high-fructose corn syrup contract in part to poor delivery
specifications.     Powers   (1967)   reports   that   seemingly   minor   alterations   to   the
specifications of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's frozen pork belly contract had a
significant impact on the level of trading activity.   Horrigan (1987) cites a lack of
correspondence between the CPI and potential hedgers' actual consumption bundles as a
factor that contributed to the failure of the CPI futures contract.
Prevention of manipulation is a consideration closely related to contract design.  Futures
contract specifications must not be such that a single party or group is likely to control a
significant portion of deliverable supplies (Gray 1966).  Such a condition would facilitate
an artificial increase in the futures price in the event that the party that controls the
deliverable supplies also stood for delivery on a significant long futures position.  The
occurrence or perceived possibility of such market “corners” or “squeezes” would
understandably engender reservation on the part of potential market participants, and
would prove detrimental to a fledgling market's success.   A common strategy for
preventing corners and squeezes is to allow delivery of nonstandard grades of an
underlying asset at a premium or discount to the futures price, although this can result in
the futures price reflecting one of the nonstandard grades that shorts deem to be cheapest
to  deliver.     Carlton  (1984)   also  observes   that   successful  contracts   are  based   on
commodities   whose   prices   are   not   heavily   influenced   by   government-sponsored
manipulation (e.g. price support programs in agricultural markets), as such policy is often
specifically devised to attenuate price variability, which in turn reduces the need forhedging.     A   contract   might   also   suffer   if   government   provides   competing   risk-
management services (e.g. crop insurance programs).
IV. Analyses of Current Contract Proposals
Real Estate Price Index Derivatives 
Case, Shiller & Weiss (CSW, 1993) propose the establishment of futures and options
contracts that would be cash-settled on the basis of residential real estate price indices.
4
They suggest that the geographic scope of the underlying price indices should be, at most,
regions of the US (e.g., the Northeast), but that price indices covering individual cities
would be preferable.  They present compelling arguments supporting this idea.   Real
estate comprises the majority of national wealth, spread across a very large number of
owners.  Hence exposure to real estate price risk is pervasive.  Residential real estate
price uncertainty in particular is a significant source of risk to individual wealth, as
almost all individuals have either significant long or (implicit) short positions in this
market.  It thus seems as though vehicles that provided convenient means of efficiently
reallocating this risk would provide significant benefits to society.  Almost no vehicles
exist for hedging this type of risk.  It thus seems as though the landscape of the existing
contracts and hedging vehicles is favorable with regard to the potential for the proposed
contracts to attract hedging activity.
There are many potential hedgers who might use residential real estate price index
derivatives.   Homeowners and landlords are obviously at risk, as direct owners of
residential real estate.   Others face less obvious risks associated with price declines.
Mortgage lenders face default risk in the event of an economic downturn.  Home builders
face the risk that homes prices will fall between the times that construction decisions and
sales are made.  Municipalities face the risk of decreasing property tax revenues in the
event of falling home prices.  Prospective homeowners and renters are potential sources
of long hedging interest. The average actual or potential homeowner has no experience
hedging using derivatives markets, however.  CSW suggest that this obstacle might be
overcome by repackaging  the  derivatives into familiar-looking insurance products.
Shiller & Weiss (1999) expand on this theme.
5  While individuals are generally endowed
with a surfeit of residential real estate price risk, institutional investors currently have no
practical means of gaining exposure to this market.  Residential real estate thus represents
a heretofore untapped asset class that institutional investors could use to diversify their
portfolios, increasing there efficiency as they say in portfolio parlance.
The futures and options contracts proposed by CSW would be exchange-traded, and as
such would be introduced with accompanying clearinghouse guarantees for traders.  This
mitigates any concerns over counterparty risk.  Given the significant transaction costs
associated with real estate transactions, it would seem that the price indices that might
underlie the proposed contracts would be difficult to manipulate.
4 They suggest contracts based on commercial and agricultural land as well, but residential real estate price
index contracts have received the most subsequent attention.
5 The experience of Caplin, et al. (2003) suggests that this may be a difficult undertaking.The CSW proposal satisfies many of the conditions for contract success.   There are,
however, other conditions that are likely to be only marginally satisfied.  The exchange-
traded nature of the proposed contracts implies there would be no officially designated
market maker that is required to provide liquidity, but it would instead be provided by
short-run speculative traders.   A necessary condition for attracting such trading is a
reasonable degree of short-run uncertainty regarding underlying price indices.  In the case
of a city-wide (or wider) real estate price index, however, short-run fluctuations are likely
to be very small relative to overall value, suggesting that these markets might have a
difficult time attracting liquidity-providing scalpers.  If this is in fact the case, there is
little that could be done to overcome this obstacle.
While short-run real-estate price uncertainty is likely to be minimal, the long-run price
uncertainty that is more relevant to many potential hedgers seems to be more significant.
This, combined with the substantial financial leverage that is generally employed in real
estate purchases, would seem to imply a significant motivation for hedging activity.
Unfortunately, as discussed in CSW, hedging long-run price risk using the short-term
contracts would be difficult at best, and only the short-term contracts have a reasonable
potential to attract voluntary liquidity providers.
There are some conditions for contract market success that the CSW proposal will have a
very difficult time overcoming.   The novelty of the contracts proposed by CSW
potentially limits there attractiveness to large-scale speculators.  Such traders would have
few avenues through which they might lay-off risk associated sizable positions, and
spread trading opportunities would be limited.
The contracts envisioned by CSW would be need to be based on freely-reported price
indices that are widely accepted as standard, reliable value benchmarks.  No such indices
exist at this time.  Certainly, there are extensive proprietary price indices that are used by
industry, perhaps most notably the “REdex” repeat sales price indices maintained by the
Case Shiller Wise branch of Fimat.   As these are not freely-reported, however, they
cannot effectively serve as a basis for trading.   Given this state of affairs, the CSW
proposal fails to satisfy one of the necessary conditions for contract viability.  This lack of
a basis for trading represents a significant, but not insurmountable, hurdle that that must
be overcome before trading could commence in the proposed contracts.
The choice of underlying price indices represents a significant contract design challenge.
The tradeoff between potential liquidity and basis risk for potential hedgers that is
inherent to contract design is especially pronounced in the case of the CSW proposition.
Regional price indices would seem to represent the smallest feasible geographic scope
that could attract sufficient liquidity to the proposed contracts, but unfortunately such
indices would expose hedgers to a high degree of price risk.   Basis risk concerns
motivated Caplin, et al. (2003) to select zip-code level price indices to underlie price
index-based home price insurance contracts.
One possible avenue for overcoming this obstacle is the “pass-through” insurance
imagined in CSW and Shiller and Weiss (1999).  Derivative contracts might be based on
regional price indices, and writers of the pass-through insurance could then absorb theremaining basis risk and write policies on smaller geographic regions such as zip code.
This would be similar to, say, the natural gas market, where there is a symbiosis between
the OTC and exchange-traded derivatives markets.  The OTC derivatives dealers write
contracts custom tailored for their clients, and lay off a portion of the risk using the
exchange traded contracts.  As a result, both markets thrive – each benefiting from the
existence of the other.  A regional geographic scope for the exchange-traded contracts
would still allow the derivatives to serve the needs of institutional long hedgers (lenders
exposed to residential mortgage default risk) and institutional investors.
Overall, however, there are serious obstacles to the successful establishment of exchange-
traded real estate price index contracts, and such establishment cannot be considered
likely in the short to medium term.  A current effort afoot in California is attempting to
refute this analysis.   Advanced e-Financial Technologies, Inc. endeavors to establish
futures and options markets based on zip-code level real-estate price indexes.  Initially,
AeFT plans to offer futures on three to five zip codes in Corona, Pasadena and Santa
Monica, California (Freidman 2003).
Economic Derivatives
Recently, financial services firms Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank and inter-dealer
broker ICAP have initiated trading in “economic derivatives” contracts – cash-settled
over-the-counter options whose payoffs are determined by various economic statistics.
Underlyings include U.S. Non-Farm Payrolls, U.S. Initial Jobless Claims, the ISM
Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), U.S. Retail Sales (excluding autos),
and the Euro-zone Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP; excluding tobacco).
These markets are operated as “parimutuel derivative call auctions” (PDCAs), an
innovative new market structure that renders several of the conditions for market success
that we describe to be easily fulfilled.
The PDCA market structure, developed by Longitude, Inc., is distinguished from
conventional derivatives markets by two features.  First, trading is not continuous, but
rather carried out during a limited number (one or two) of short-lived (one to two hour)
auctions prior to the release of the underlying economic statistic.  Second, buy orders for
specific contracts are not necessarily matched with sell orders for identical contracts.
Instead, the final auction prices for all contracts with same underlying are determined in
such a way that the payoffs for all filled orders will exactly exhaust the premiums
collected, regardless of the level of the underlying at the contracts’ expiration (hence the
appearance of “parimutuel” in PDCA).   Essentially, in a PDCA the entire pool of
positions based on a single source of uncertainty constitute a zero-sum game, unlike
traditional one-to-one trade matching where each individual trade is a zero-sum game.
This “many-to-many matching” is accomplished by traders placing limit orders for
positions in the various contracts during the auction’s bidding period, and each of these
potential positions implies a particular replicating portfolio in underlying Arrow-Debreu
state-contingent securities.  At the conclusion of the auction’s bidding period, collectedpremium-maximizing prices (given the limit order book) are selected for the state-
contingent securities, subject to the parimutuel constraint (Longitude, 2003).
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The parimutuel market structure ensures that traders need not concern themselves with
counterparty risk, as all payouts will be funded by collected premiums.  The condition
that market making services be provided must be reinterpreted to mean simply that there
must be a party willing to operate the PDCA many-to-many matching system.  Given that
there is no need for a conventional market maker (or makers) who might accumulate an
unbalanced book, there also need not exist correlated markets for laying off risk.  Given
that orders need only be matched with a complimentary (from a payoff perspective) pool
of orders for possible quite different contracts, the condition that a large, diverse
underlying trade exist is greatly relaxed.  Liquidity is pooled across all traders with an
interest in the same underlying risk, rather than being pooled only across traders with
interests in each particular contract.  While this latter condition is greatly relaxed, there
must obviously be at least some exposure in the economy to a particular underlying risk. 
The particulars of each market employing the PDCA structure will determine whether or
not the other conditions for contract market success are satisfied.   Each of the new
markets listed above obviously satisfies the conditions that a basis for trading exist, the
contracts are certainly novel (i.e., have a favorable relation to existing contracts), and
underlying economic statistics are unlikely to be manipulated.  There is without doubt
uncertainty regarding these statistics, providing an impetus for trade to those whose
fortunes are affected by statistical releases, mostly large portfolio managers.   These
various managers’ portfolios are undoubtedly situated on either “side” of a particular
release (e.g., some portfolios will benefit from an increase in Non-farm Payrolls, other
will suffer), so that potential hedgers have heterogeneous goals.  
If there is one weak aspect to the presently considered markets, it is that substantial basis
risk is likely to exist for most potential hedgers.  For example, it is obvious that releases
of the macroeconomic statistics that underlie these contracts can have significant impacts
on debt and equity portfolios, but it is often difficult to predict the direction and
magnitude of these of impacts.
Livelihood Insurance Contracts
Shiller (2003) proposes livelihood insurance contracts based on labor income indices.
Although the proposed contracts are described as insurance, they are not designed to
protect against a sudden, substantial loss or expense that a person or entity might
experience.  They are instead meant to be useful for hedging labor income uncertainty
6 This system bears some resemblance to the system by which futures contracts are traded on the Tokyo
Grain Exchange (TGE), especially in that both systems feature tatonnement auctions that minimize the
potential for the short-run liquidity mismatches that can plague continuous double auction markets.  At the
TGE, however, a single market-clearing price is found each day for each individual contract (i.e., a single
futures delivery), whereas in a PDCA notional value-maximizing prices are found for all contracts (that are
based on a single underlying source of uncertainty) simultaneously.   Also, the payoffs to the contracts
established on TGE are not collectively self-financed as the PDCA contracts are; TGE futures markets
feature the performance bond requirements and daily marking-to-market that characterize most other
exchange-traded derivative contracts. that unfolds gradually over time, and thus share a common characteristic with typical
derivative contracts.
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Shiller argues that the potential for changes in the compensation that can be earned in an
individual’s chosen profession represents one of the largest risks that most people face.
Livelihood insurance contracts would allow individuals to hedge this risk, allowing
young people to choose potentially risky career paths knowing that they would be assured
some minimal level of income.  No mechanisms currently exist for hedging this type of
risk, a favorable factor for attracting the hedging activity necessary for contract success.
The indices that would underlie the proposed contracts would each be based on repeated
observations of the income levels of fully employed individuals who had undertaken
similar career training.   These individuals would be considered to be in the same
occupation and would continue to influence the appropriate income index, regardless of
their current line of work.   This construction distinguishes these indices from other
existing labor indices in that they would reflect the true economic fortunes of people who
choose similar training, rather than reflecting the incomes of people who remain in a
given profession.  This distinction would be very important in the case of a profession
that experienced a significant decline in the numbers of individuals employed.   The
remaining individuals could possibly enjoy income levels similar to those before the
decline, while those that were forced to find alternative employment found their incomes
significantly reduced.  In this situation, conventional indices like those published by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics would be little changed, while the indices proposed by Shiller
would reflect the overall decline in the profession.  Thus the latter indices would be much
more effective for managing the risk associated with career choice, reducing the basis risk
faced by policy holders.  Minimal basis risk is one component of the good contract design
that would be necessary to attract hedgers to the new contracts.  Similar labor income
indices are described in Shiller (1993) and constructed in Shiller and Schneider (1993).  
Shiller suggests that basic contracts might work as follow.  Policy holders would be paid,
on an ongoing basis, a percentage of the “decline in the income of the average person
who has started working in the field (and who continues to work, though not necessarily
in the same field, or has gone back to school for retraining) below a specified lower level
for the income.”  Basing payments on the index rather than on individual income avoids a
moral hazard problem, as each individual’s effort could have only an insignificant impact
on the index level.  Premiums might be paid as a percentage of future income, or as a
single up-front sum.  The latter alternative would result in a policy that closely resembled
a “floor” derivative contract, while the former alternative would result in a policy that
somewhat resembled a swap.  The single up-front premium (the floor-like policy) would
prevent a gradual adverse selection   problem whereby  policy  holders  cancel  there
coverage in the event that their profession thrives, potentially leaving the insurance
company in the position of collecting too little in premiums to cover the payouts to the
policy holders in less successful professions.
7 Shiller (1993) and Shiller and Schneider (1993) propose labor income index futures and options contracts.
They provide very little detail on how such contracts might be designed however, and the present
suggestion for livelihood insurance contracts seems to supercede this earlier proposal.There are some conditions for contract market success that this proposal only marginally
fulfills.  The uncertainty inherent in the compensation received in many professions will
only be minimal.   The hypothetical doctoral student imagined by Shiller who was
considering a career in recombinant DNA technology undoubtedly would face substantial
uncertainty  regarding   future   income   given   the   uncertainty  surrounding   the   future
commercial value of that technology.  However professions such as electrician, school
teacher, and taxi driver involve significantly less uncertainty and people contemplating
entering these professions would be unlikely to purchase livelihood insurance.  The pool
of likely policy purchasers seems limited to those people entering professions with high
income risk that require extensive, costly training.
The condition for contract market success that traders have heterogeneous goals requires
reinterpretation given that an insurance market is proposed rather than a conventional
derivatives market.  Rather than long and short hedgers roughly balancing one another’s
positions, the market maker (the insurance company) would always be on the long side of
each profession’s income index (i.e., each individual market) and policy holders would
always be on the short side.
8   Similar to conventional insurance markets where insurance
companies are highly diversified across individuals, the insurance company would ideally
be highly diversified across professions.   Rather than requiring heterogeneous trader
goals, this proposed market’s success would depend on sufficient interest from diverse
professions with risky income prospects.  
Insurance is successful in settings where risks across policy holders are essentially
uncorrelated, and loss probabilities can be reasonably evaluated.  In the present setting,
however, various professions’ income indices would be correlated to some extent, some
highly so.  This situation would be similar to the familiar optimal portfolio allocation
problem, were it not for the fact that the insurance company’s portfolio would be
determined by policy purchasers rather than being chosen the insurance company itself.
The company’s problem then would be to optimally set premiums given i) the expected
policy portfolio that will result from future customer purchases and ii) some model of the
joint dynamics of all income indices in the portfolio.   This is very different from
conventional actuarial analyses, conventional optimal portfolio allocation problems, and
conventional derivative contract valuation problems.  Solving such a problem represents a
significant challenge that would need to be overcome before this proposal could be
implemented.
The   difficulty  of   the   premium-setting   problem   will   be   intensified   by  significant
informational limitations. As yet, the price indices that would underlie these contracts are
not generated and maintained, and there is thus neither a basis for trading nor any labor
income price index histories to aid in premium-setting.   Such labor income index
8 Shiller makes no mention of the possibility of insurance companies selling policies to employers who are
concerned about increases in a particular profession’s income index.  Selling policies to both sides of the
market would seem to be a natural means of significantly reducing risk that the insurance companies would
face in making such markets.  The relative levels of buying interest that the insurance company experienced
from each side of the market would also help them to discover appropriate premiums for each profession.
This would be particularly helpful when setting premiums for policies covering new professions in rapidly
evolving industries (just the type of professions that might show significant interest in purchasing policies)
that have little or no income history and prospects that are difficult to evaluate.histories are not likely to develop in the absence of trading, however, as this would be the
primary application of these difficult and expensive to maintain indices.  In the event that
this   initial   data   limitation   could   somehow   be   overcome   (say   with   government
establishment of such indices for some period before trading started), there would still
remain ongoing data issues.  As the example presented in Shiller (2003) illustrates, such
insurance would find its most likely customers among those considering embarking on a
career in a highly specialized profession based on a just-emerging scientific sub-
discipline or technology, with highly uncertain prospects.  By definition, however, such a
profession will have no significant income index history that could aid in premium
setting.  For these reasons, premium-setting based on historical data appears to be of
limited applicability.
The alternative would be to set premiums based on subjective evaluations of the
uncertainty surrounding each profession’s prospects, and the interrelations among those
prospects, quite possibly resulting in significant, costly misjudgments on the part of a
potential underwriter.  This model uncertainty, combined with a lack of markets available
for laying off underwriter risk, suggests that it may be very difficult to entice a market-
making function for such markets (i.e., an insurance concern willing to write such
policies), one of the necessary conditions for market establishment and success.
Commodity-linked Developing World Debt
Caballero (2003) offers a proposal aimed at stabilizing the sometimes dramatic capital
flow reversals occasionally experienced by developing countries.  Such reversals may or
may not eventually result in full blown economic crises, but a country is sure to endure
significant economic and social hardship regardless of whether or not crisis-averting
countermeasures prove effective.  He observes that such reversals are often precipitated
by a decline in the price of a commodity that the country exports in large quantity; and on
which the country’s economy critically depends.  Given this state of affairs, he reasons
that instruments designed to hedge the country’s commodity price exposure would, by
backward induction, forestall the capital flight and currency attacks typically associated
with a significant deterioration in the commodity’s price, thus obviating the need for
unpleasant countermeasures.  Caballero specifically proposes that the external debt of
developing countries should embed relevant commodity price floors (i.e., series of put
options).  Specific countries that he suggests might benefit from such commodity-linked
bonds include Chile (copper), Mexico (crude oil), Brazil (coffee), Russia (crude oil), and
South Korea (semi-conductors).
This proposal successfully fulfills many of the conditions necessary for contract market
success.   Significant price uncertainty is associated with the relevant commodities,
providing the impetus for trade, and there exist clearly defined and observed commodity
prices that would provide a basis for trade and settlement.   Giving the debt-issuing
country the benefit of the doubt, we could rate the proposed contracts as having a
favorable counterparty risk profile.
Less favorable is the relationship between the proposed contracts and existing contracts.
Caballero argues that existing commodity derivative markets cannot absorb risks of themagnitude that commodity export-dependent developing countries face.  However, there
is no particular reason to believe that simply coupling the commodity price risk with the
high-yield interest rate and default risks associated with developing countries’ external
debt is going to result in any increase in speculative and long hedging interest in a
particular commodity.  Caballero suggests that collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
might be used to decouple the commodity price risk from the issuer’s default risk, so that
investors with no country-specific expertise could absorb the former.  In any event, there
must exist counterparties willing to absorb the commodity price risk, regardless of
whether this happens in the market for the commodity-linked bonds, the market for a
CDO’s default risk-free bond tranches, or in existing (pre-decoupled!) commodity futures
and options markets.  In short, coffee, crude oil, and copper futures and options markets
already exist.
The most troubling aspect of this proposal, however, is that a significant moral hazard
problem would exist for most intended applications.  Consider some facts surrounding
proposed Chilean copper-linked debt, which serves as Caballero’s primary example.
 In 2001, Chile accounted for 35% of world mine production of copper (Edelstein,
2002)
 Codelco, the state-owned copper giant, holds approximately 70% of national cop-
per reserves (Latin-Focus).
It would thus seem that Chile (the national government in particular) has substantial
potential to influence copper prices.   Reports from the financial press confirm this.
Carpenter (2003) reports that on one day in December 2003 “copper futures in New York
had their biggest gain in almost two-years after unions threatened to strike at a mine
owned by Chile’s Codelco, the world’s biggest producer of the metal”.  Prices rose to a 6-
year high on the mere threat that only 16% of Colelco’s supply could be disrupted.  There
is little doubt, then, that Chile could, if it so desired, greatly increase world copper
production in the intermediate or longer run.  By doing so, it would simultaneously sell
large amounts of copper and profit on the resulting contingent claims payoffs.   If
investors would be willing to buy such bonds at all, they would do so only at very
unfavorable prices.  The equilibrium in a market for the proposed instruments would
necessarily take into account Chile’s likely level of output  given its hedge, and the
implications of that level of production for copper prices.
Similar moral hazard problems plague the other suggested applications: Brazil accounted
for 42% of total world production of coffee in the 2002/2003 season (USDA, 2003), and
Mexico accounted for an estimated 4.8% of total world production of crude oil in 2002
(EIA 2003).   The possibility of Mexican oil-linked bonds may be a somewhat more
reasonable suggestion than the others, but given the highly inelastic demand for oil this is
still questionable. In the end, the only useful application of commodity-linked developing
country debt that would steer clear of moral hazard problems would be associated with a
country that produces only a tiny portion of world output, but whose domestic economy is
highly dependant on exporting that production.   For example, coffee prices have a
significant impact on the economy of Costa Rica, yet the country as a whole accounts for
only approximately 2% of world production.V.  Conclusions
Academia and the finance industry generate a large number of proposals for new contract
markets.  Of these proposals, many will never be instituted, and the majority of those that
are will fail.  The purpose of this paper is to review the conditions that promote market
success, and to assess the disposition of several current proposals with regard to those
conditions.
We find that the conditions that promote market success have mostly been previously
identified in the literature.   We take some exception, however, to the conventional
wisdom that a low correlation between the values underlying the new and existing
contracts is a prerequisite for contract market success.   Correlated markets allow an
avenue through which liquidity providers can lay off risk, may allow hedging of
economic transformation activities, or may provide relief from contract lumpiness
problems.
Some patterns emerge from our analyses of current contract market proposals.   All
proposals seem to fairly carefully consider the extent of hedging use that a new contract
might enjoy, and the extent of variability in the value that would underlie the new
contract.  Indeed, the perceived existence of a hedging need is often the inspiration for a
proposal.  With regard to the other characteristics of successful markets, however, there is
significant variation across proposals.  Proposals emanating from the academy often fail
to fully consider all of the remaining factors, particularly the means by which liquidity
will be provided in the fledgling market.   These proposals typically face significant
hurdles that must be overcome before the proposed markets could achieve success, or, in
some cases, before they could even be implemented at all.   By contrast, proposals
emanating from the finance industry, such as the economic derivatives proposal, are more
likely to have considered all factors that promote contract market success, and have
commensurately brighter prospects.
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